Privileged accounts, root, administrator, service accounts, database superusers, have one thing in common: they can do things that ordinary accounts cannot. They can install software, access sensitive data without restriction, modify security configurations, create new accounts, and cover their tracks. In the wrong hands, a single privileged account can compromise an entire organisation. That is why privileged accounts are the primary target of sophisticated attackers, and why protecting them requires a fundamentally different approach than protecting ordinary user accounts.
In most organisations before PAM, privileged account management was informal at best. Root passwords were shared among team members and rarely changed. Service accounts used the same password across dozens of systems, rotated never or infrequently, because changing them required manually updating every system that used them. When a system administrator left, IT hoped that the shared passwords would be changed, but the operational disruption of changing passwords on everything at once meant it was often deferred indefinitely. Former employees retained privileged access to critical systems for months or years after departure.
PAM addresses this systematically: it stores privileged credentials in a secure vault, rotates them automatically, requires authentication and authorisation before credentials are released, records every privileged session, and ensures that access to admin capabilities follows just-in-time principles, granted when needed for a specific task, revoked when the task is complete.